The second characteristic upon which the automobile exception is based is the diminished expectation of privacy in a car. California v. Carney, supra at II. Automobiles are subject to pervasive governmental regulation and control, especially with regard to safety and licensing, and the "public is fully aware that it is accorded less privacy in its automobiles because of this compelling governmental need for regulation. However, the "automobile exception" cases do not hold that a search warrant is never needed to search a car.
There is an automobile exception to the search warrant requirement, not an exemption. Otherwise, the Supreme Court of the United States would have held that the police would not, under any circumstances, need to obtain a search warrant for an automobile, provided they have probable cause for the search.
Instead, the Supreme Court explained how ready mobility and the diminished expectation of privacy in an automobile delineate the circumstances of a permissible warrantless search:. See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, U. If the police have probable cause to search a car under the aforementioned circumstances, "the overriding societal interests in effective law enforcement justify an immediate search before the vehicle and its occupants become unavailable.
We conclude that the automobile exception does not apply where, as here, the suspect's car was legally parked in his residential parking space, the suspect and his only alleged cohort were not in the vehicle or near it and did not have access to it, and the police seized the automobile without a warrant, placed it on a wrecker and hauled it away to be searched at a later date. See California v. Carney, supra ; Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, supra. Moreover, only the prior approval of a magistrate is waived when a warrantless search is conducted under the automobile exception. The search must otherwise be such that a magistrate could authorize. Carney, supra at III , S. A warrantless search under the automobile exception "is not unreasonable if based on facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant, even though a warrant has not actually been obtained.
Ross, U. As previously established in Division 1, the affidavit supporting the search warrant for Lejeune's apartment, which was identical to the supporting affidavit for the invalid January 22 search warrant for the car, was inadequate because it failed to establish Vaughn's reliability.
The trial court, however, found probable cause to seize and search the car, not only because of Vaughn's information in the affidavit supporting the apartment search warrant, but also because the police knew about the "controlled call" which was not mentioned in the affidavit. At the hearing on the motions to suppress, the officers mentioned the "controlled call," but no testimony was elicited regarding what Lejeune said during the call.
Thus, there is no basis in the record for the trial court's finding that the "controlled call" corroborated Vaughn and supported probable cause for the automobile search. The probable cause determination to support a warrantless search under the automobile exception "must be based on objective facts that could justify the issuance of a warrant by a magistrate.
Ross, supra at , S. Such facts are not in the record, and we cannot infer their existence. We therefore conclude that the trial court's order denying the motion to suppress the automobile search was clearly erroneous and that the evidence obtained by the police as a result of this search must be suppressed. On May 12, , the trial court quashed the first bill of indictment charging Lejeune with murder and the other offenses because one of the grand jurors was not qualified to serve.
On the next day, the State filed a notice of appeal from this order. On May 14, while the State's appeal was pending, the Fulton County grand jury again indicted Lejeune. He moved to quash the second bill of indictment, on the ground that the trial court was divested of jurisdiction due to the pending appeal. The trial court permitted the State to enter a nolle prosequi over Lejeune's objection.
The State then withdrew its appeal of the order on the first indictment and sought and obtained a third indictment of Lejeune. The trial court denied the plea of former jeopardy and Lejeune appeals.
See Gourley v. Gourley v. State, supra at 1 , S. Only the State may initiate a nolle prosequi order. Redding v. State, supra at 2 , S. The filing of the notice of appeal did not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to entertain and grant the State's petition for a nolle prosequi order. See Strickland v. Accordingly, the trial court correctly denied the plea of former jeopardy. Judgments affirmed in Case Nos. S02A and S02A Judgment reversed in Case No.
Your Notes edit none. Cited By 18 This case has been cited by other opinions: Bryant v. State State v. Lejeune State v. Two days into the trial, Barnes approved a plea bargain whereby the year-old Ashe would be sentenced to probation if the unmarried mother of seven others agreed to a tubal ligation.
State v. Lejeune , Ga. Later, LeJeune took Davis' head to a lake house on Lake Lanier and put it in a vise to try to remove the bullet, prosecutors allege.
Jean Davis testified yesterday in Fulton County Superior Court that the last time she talked to Ronnie Davis he called her in North Carolina to ask for money to retrieve his impounded car. She testified that her son had told her he had had the worst Christmas of his life.
After Anand agreed to testify against LeJeune, murder and aggravated assault charges against her were dismissed. LeJeune was first brought in front of a jury in March, but a mistrial was declared because of the courthouse shootings, which had distressed some jurors.
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